Freedom of Expression
4 - Chapter III - Jurisprudence (continued)
2. Domestic Jurisprudence of the Member States
1. Introduction
73. The Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression has pursued the aim of furthering comparative law studies as a way of contributing to the flow of information between the member States regarding the international standards which govern the right to freedom of expression, in the hope that it will lead to a deeper understanding and establishment of the right to freedom of expression in the Americas. Following these initiatives, the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression has included in its 2003 Annual Report a Chapter describing the jurisprudence of the European system and presenting decisions of local courts from the member States that essentially uphold the standards of freedom of expression.[42]
74. In this section, the report refers to the States' domestic jurisprudence, and it includes certain decisions by local tribunals that were handed down during 2003 and that reflect the importance of respecting freedom of expression as protected in the American Convention.
75. This section highlights some court decisions that have expressly or implicitly taken account of international standards protecting freedom of expression. In other words, this section is not a critique of judicial decisions, but rather an attempt to show that in many cases those standards are indeed considered. The Rapporteur hopes that this attitude will prevail among other judges in the hemisphere.
76. As a final thought, it will be clear that not all opinions in the decisions quoted are shared by the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, but that the Office agrees with the fundamentals of the decisions. As a second point, there is no doubt that there are many other cases that could have been summarized in this report. The selection has been somewhat arbitrary, both for reasons of space and for lack of sufficient information. The Rapporteur’s Office urges States to provide it in the future with more judicial decisions enforcing the inter-American system of protection of freedom of expression, so that this section can be expanded in subsequent annual reports.
77. The organization of this section takes account, as it must, of the standards arising from interpretation of Article 13 of the Convention, which declares that:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one's choice.
2. The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall not be subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent imposition of liability, which shall be expressly established by law to the extent necessary to ensure:
a. respect for the rights or reputations of others; or
b. the protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals.
3. The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of information, or by any other means tending to impede the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions.
4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2 above, public entertainments may be subject by law to prior censorship for the sole purpose of regulating access to them for the moral protection of childhood and adolescence.
5. Any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitute incitements to lawless violence or to any other similar action against any person or group of persons on any grounds including those of race, color, religion, language, or national origin shall be considered as offenses punishable by law.
78. The standards referred to have been further developed by the jurisprudence of both the Commission and the Court. Many of those standards have been included in the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression.[43] For these reasons, the categories described below are related to the various principles of that Declaration. In this report, the categories selected are: a) the concession of radio and television broadcast frequencies according to democratic criteria that provides equal opportunity of access for all individuals, in Principle 12; b) the right to access public information, in Principle 4; c) the principle of distinction between public figures and private persons in criminal defamation cases, in Principle 10; and d) the ban on prior censorship, in Principle 5.
79. This report covers case law from Argentina, Uruguay, Costa Rica and Chile. In each of the categories, the relevant principle is quoted from the Declaration, followed by a short summary of the facts of the case, and extracts from the decision of the domestic court.
a. Democratic criteria for the concession of radio and television broadcast frequencies
80. Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression. Principle 12. "(…) The concession of radio and television broadcast frequencies should take into account democratic criteria that provide equal opportunity of access for all individuals."
81. Case decided by: Supreme Court of Argentina, Decision of September 1st, 2003. Case A. 215. XXXVII - "Asociación Mutual Carlos Mujica c/ Estado Nacional (Poder Ejecutivo Nacional - COMFER) s/ amparo."
82. Facts of the case. The Carlos Mujica Mutual Association (Asociación Mutual Carlos Mujica), which runs a radio station with frequency modulation, brought an appeal for constitutional protection (amparo) against the State, challenging the constitutional validity of the following laws: Article 45 of Law No. 22.285 and its regulatory decree No. 286/81; Executive Decrees No. 310/98 and 2/99; Resolutions 16/99 of the Federal Committee of Broadcasting (Comité Federal de Radiodifusión, COMFER); and Resolution No. 2344/98 of the National Department of Communications (Secretaría de Comunicaciones de la Nación). According to these provisions, only the applicants for a legal concession to provide a station of sound broadcasting with frequency modulation who are a "physical person or commercial corporation which is legally constituted" are eligible for such concession, excluding therefore civil corporations, cooperatives, and mutual associations. The appellant alleged that Article 45 of the Broadcasting Law (Ley de Radiodifusión) interferes with the right of a large sector of the community made up of the associations that are not regulated by the legislation to provide a media service competitively, violating their right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by the Argentine Constitution and the American Convention on Human Rights. The Appellate Court of the Province of Córdobaconfirmed the decision of the lower court in that it declared that the legislation in question violated the Argentine Constitution. The Federal Committee of Broadcasting (Comité Federal de Radiodifusión) appealed this decision before the Supreme Court of Argentina.
83. Decision. (pertinent paragraphs)
According to the legal framework that governs broadcasting, in order to apply for a legal authorization to provide a broadcasting station with frequency modulation, it is required that the applicant is a physical person or a commercial corporation that is legally constituted, which excludes civil associations, cooperatives, and mutual and non-profit associations.[44]
Such a provision cannot be arbitrary in its absolute exclusion of certain associations, preventing its members from applying for a broadcasting license for the only reason that they are not constituted as a commercial corporation regulated by the law, and without this exclusion being based on an objective and reasonable criteria, because this ultimately amounts to an unreasonable limitation of the right to freedom of expression and of the right to freedom of association.[45]
The participation of a mutual association in a bidding process with the aim of acquiring a broadcasting license, if it is selected from amongst the bidders, promotes the diversity of opinions which defines a democratic society, and constitutes a true balance to economic groups. This is why the limitation imposed by the challenged legal provisions is unjustified and constitutes a clear violation of the right to freedom of association, as it imposes the end for which people will legally associate, without there being a sufficient justification for sustaining an imposition which prevents certain non-profit organizations from conducting an activity which is in essence of a cultural nature.[46]
The Court does not find that there is a higher aim which would authorize preventing the complainant from participating in a bidding process aimed at regularizing his legal situation and being able, if chosen, to exercise his right to freedom of expression. Therefore, the first paragraph of Article 45 of Law No. 22.285 and its regulatory and complementary provisions, in as much as they prevent the plaintiff from participating in the bidding process to obtain a broadcasting license for the reason of not being legally constituted as a corporation, violate Articles 14, 16, 28 and 75 para. 23 of the National Constitution and Article 13 of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights.[47]
a. The right to access public information
84. Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression. Principle 4. "Access to information held by the state is a fundamental right of every individual. States have the obligation to guarantee the full exercise of this right. This principle allows only exceptional limitations that must be previously be established by law in case of a real and imminent danger that threatens national security in democratic societies."
85. Case decided by: Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Costa Rica. Decision of May 2, 2003. File: 02-009167-0007-CO, Res. 2003-03489.
86. Facts of the case. On October 8, 2002, the Representative José Humberto Arce Salas presented a request for information to the Board of Directors of the Bank of Costa Rica regarding the irregularities in the private financing of political parties, reflected in the acceptance of large donations by companies and foreign businessmen which had not been reported to the Supreme Election Board. The information requested by the Representative included the following: a) if the parties "Unidad Social Cristiana", "Liberación Nacional", or any other party which had participated in the last national elections had had current accounts listed in their names in the Bank during the past year; and b) if the companies Plutón S.A., Faltros SR.S S.A, Gramínea Plateada S.A. and Bayano S.A. had had current accounts in that Bank during the past year, given their relation to the treasuries of the political parties. The Board of Directors of the Bank denied Representative Arce Salas access to the requested information, on the grounds that such information was protected by bank secrecy and the right to privacy. The Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Costa Rica declared by unanimous vote the admissibility of the appeal for constitutional protection presented by the Representative José Humberto Arce Salas against the Bank of Costa Rica.
87. Decision. (pertinent paragraphs)
Regarding the request for information posed by the complainant, and in order to avoid confusion, it is necessary to point out that it presents two aspects that demand a differentiated solution, namely: a) the request for information relative to the current accounts contracted by the parties of Unidad Social Cristiana and Liberación Nacional and, generally, any party that participated in the last National Elections, and b) the request regarding the current accounts contracted by the various companies which allegedly would be involved with the treasury departments of the political parties. Regarding issue a) it is important to note that given that the funds of the parties (whether they have a public or private source) are, by constitutional mandate (Article 96, paragraph 3 of the National Constitution) subject to the principles of publicity and transparency, the number of current accounts, their movement and balance in the commercial banks of the state, private banks or any financial entity are of public interest, and therefore, can be accessed by any person.[48]
Regarding issue b), this Court assesses that the number of accounts held by any juridical person or collective organization constituted according to private law—corporation, partnership, limited liability company, foundation, association, etc.—its movements and balances are in principle protected by the right to privacy, as in this case the express limitation provided by the Constitution for the contributions to political parties does not operate. In this case, the law of bank secrecy stated in Article 615 of the Commercial Code is also applicable. The aforesaid rule has as an exception that operates in the case that there is unequivocal evidence that a political party has transferred part of its private funds to a privately-owned company. In this case, the information would cease to be of a private nature—as is characteristic of a merely contractual relationship—and would become of public interest.[49]
The action is declared admissible solely with relation to the request for information regarding the current accounts in the Bank held by the Unidad Social Cristiana, Liberación Nacional and any other parties that participated in the last elections, as well as by the companies Gramínea Plateada and Bayano, as it was demonstrated that accounts were opened listed with the names of these companies to guarantee the flow of funds and expenses incurred by the electoral campaign of the party Unidad Social Cristiana.[50]
b. Criminal defamation and public officials
88. Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression.Principle 10. "Privacy laws should not inhibit or restrict investigation and dissemination of information of public interest. The protection of a person’s reputation should only be guaranteed through civil sanctions in those cases in which the person offended is a public official, a public person or a private person who has voluntarily become involved in matters of public interest. In addition, in these cases, it must be proven that in disseminating the news, the social communicator had the specific intent to inflict harm, was fully aware that false news was disseminated, or acted with gross negligence in efforts to determine the truth or falsity of such news."
89. Case decided by: Court of First Instance of Montevideo, Judgement of April 22, 2003.
90. Facts of the case. On February 20, 2003, the accusation brought by Mr. Mario César Alvez, a public official for the intendancy of the city of Montevideo, against Mr. Sergio Israel Dublinsky, a journalist for the periodical publication Brecha was admitted. Mr. Dublinsky was accused of having committed the crimes of libel or defamation (difamación o injurias).[51] The accusation was fueled by the publication, by Mr. Dublinsky, of a series of articles portraying the claimant's involvement in acts of corruption such as requesting the payment of a bribe, and awarding state benefits to his personal acquaintances. After the preliminary hearings were held, the issue was left to be decided by the Court of First Instance of Montevideo.
91. Decision. (pertinent paragraphs)
(…) in our country, and following the trend that was inaugurated in 1830, freedom of expression is provided for in Article 29 of the National Constitution, which states that "the expression of thoughts by words, private writings or published material, or by any other means of disclosure, is entirely free, without the need of prior censorship. The author, and, in some cases, the printer or transmitter of the statement will be responsible for the abuses they commit."[52]
The constitutional provision is in perfect agreement with international human rights norms which guarantee the right to freedom of expression. In this way, this right is provided for in Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights, in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 19), in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Article 10), in the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (Article 9), in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 19), and in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (Article IV).[53]
(…) in the present case, given that the sayings of the defendant were disclosed in several journalistic articles with a wide public reach, we are faced with a confrontation of two fundamental rights: on one hand, the right of the defendant to freely express thoughts—in the form of press freedom or freedom of information—and on the other hand, the right to the protection of honor and personal reputation of the plaintiff, both rights being protected by the mentioned national and international instruments.[54]
For this reason, we would like to stress what the American Convention of Human Rights (Pacto de San José de Costa Rica) provides in this respect, as, we must remember, the Convention is applicable in our country as of its incorporation by Law No. 15.737 of March 8, 1985, and it expressly addresses the matter at hand when it points out in Article 13.2 that "The right provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall not be subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent imposition of liability, which shall be expressly established by law to the extent necessary to ensure: a) respect for the rights or reputations of others (…)".[55]
Article 11 of the Convention further recognizes the protection of the right to privacy and dignity, stating that: "(…) no one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life, his family, his home, or his correspondence, or unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation (…)" and that "(…) [e]veryone has the right to protection of the law against such interference or attacks.
The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man also protects this right in Article 5, which declares that: "Every person has the right to the protection of the law against abusive attacks upon his honor, his reputation, and his private and family life".[56]
In its Report. No. 11/96, referring to Case No. 11.230, the Commission has held, in relation to the conflict which arises between the right to the protection of honor and the right to freedom of expression, that the right to the protection of honor does not possess a higher rank than the right to freedom of expression. In order to illustrate this idea, the Commission pointed out that Article 29 of the American Convention states that "No provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as: a) permitting any State Party, group, or person to suppress the enjoyment or exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized in this Convention or to restrict them to greater extent than is provided for herein." The Commission also recalled that Article 32.2 of the Convention establishes that "The rights of each person are limited by the rights of others, by the security of all, and by the just demands of the general welfare, in a democratic society."[57]
In its 1994 Annual Report, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights noted that "the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ("the Court") has stated that because freedom of expression and thought plays a crucial and central role in public debate, the American Convention places an "extremely high value" on this right and reduces to a minimum any restrictions on it." As the Court noted, it is in the interest of the "democratic public order inherent in the American Convention" that freedom of expression be "scrupulously respected."[58]
Several conclusions can be derived from the opinions and case law mentioned, which the interpreter must keep in mind in order to arrive to a fair solution of the very delicate issue at hand.
These are the following:
Firstly, that the general (but naturally, not absolute) principle to be kept in mind is that the right to freedom of expression, given its crucial role in promoting public debate and its relation to democratic societies and institutions, when exercised legitimately, is regarded in the national and international arenas as possessing an "extremely high value" which places it in a higher rank in relation to the other civil rights.
Secondly, that given its superior status, any restriction to this right must necessarily be reduced to a minimum, and any interference must always be linked to the legitimate needs of a democratic society.
Thirdly, that the protection offered by this right must not only be regarded as pertaining to favorable ideas, but also, most importantly, to those that might be offensive, disturbing, exaggerated, prone to incite strong reactions, or shocking, because such are the demands of pluralism and mental openness without which a democratic society cannot exist.
Fourthly, that while this right does not protect libel or other defamation offenses, nor falsity, lies or mistakes when they are a consequence of a careless disregard for the truth, it does protect the press when the information portrayed refers to public matters or public officials, even if the news contains inexact information, as long as its author believes the information to be true and had, in good faith and without malice, aimed at disclosing information of public interest.
Fifth, the superior status of the right to freedom of expression in relation to the other rights will be maintained as long as a) the information derived from it is "useful" to a democratic society, and b) there is an objective ground which leads the informer to believe that the information is true, even when it is later found to be false.
Sixth and last, and summarizing the foregoing conclusions, if an informer has legitimately exercised his right to freedom of expression, the conclusion that a violation to the right to the protection of honor has been committed cannot be validly reached.[59]
In conclusion, and in light of the foregoing, the right to the protection of the honor of the plaintiff has not been violated, as we understand that the journalist, Mr. Sergio Israel Dubinsky, has legitimately exercised his right to inform. Therefore, it must be concluded, according to the provision of Article 10 of the Republic's Constitution, that his conduct is exempt from this Magistrate's authority.[60]
b. The ban on prior censorship
92. Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression. Principle 5: "Prior censorship, direct or indirect interference in or pressure exerted upon any expression, opinion or information transmitted through any means of oral, written, artistic, visual or electronic communication must be prohibited by law. Restrictions to the free circulation of ideas and opinions, as well as the arbitrary imposition of information and the imposition of obstacles to the free flow of information violate the right to freedom of expression".
93. Case decided by: Court of Appeals of Santiago de Chile. Case of April 16, 2003. Appeal No. 5681/2002. Res. 47579 -
94. Facts of the case. The complainants, direct descendants of Arturo Prat Chacón, sought by means of an appeal for constitutional protection to obtain a precautionary measure to prevent the continuation of an exhibition that was considered to dishonor Arturo Prat Chacón, a marine officer and lawyer, and an important historic figure in Chile. On October 16, the Mercurio of Santiagopublished the information that in the "Sergio Aguirre" hall, owned by the Representative Arts Department of the University of Chile, there was to be an exhibition, starting on October 17, of the work "Prat", by Manuela Infante. The publication added that as of that date, the showing of the exhibition was not certain due to its defamatory character in relation to its portrayal of Arturo Prat Chacón. The complainants sustained that the exhibition was offensive and perverse, damaging the figure of Prat Chacón, and further expressed that the scandal which arose as a consequence of the exhibition forced the resignation of Nivia Palma, the National Coordinator of FONDART, an organization dependent on the Ministry of Education, who financially supported the exhibition with public funds. The Appeals Court of Santiago de Chile rejected the appeal on the grounds that its admittance would have amounted to prior censorship, banned by Article 13 of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights. The decision of the Appeals Court was later upheld by the Supreme Court of Santiago de Chile (ROL N° 1961, July 16, 2003).
95. Decision (pertinent paragraphs)
The complainants express, as has been noted in the first and fifth arguments of this judgment, the way in which the representation of the piece would violate the right to protection of honor, personal reputation, and private and family life of don Arturo Prat Chacón, as well as of every Chilean and member of the Historic Institute that carries his name. The alleged violation was founded on the provision of Article 19 No. 4 of the Constitution, which states: "The Constitution guarantees every person the right to respect for and protection of private and public life, and the honor of every person and his family (…)".[61]
Article 19.12 of the Constitution establishes in its first paragraph that it guarantees all people: the right to express opinions and impart information without prior censorship, in any way and by any means, notwithstanding their possible responsibility for the offenses and abuses that might result from the exercise of these freedoms. This fundamental right is also contained in Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights, also known as the Pacto de San José de Costa Rica, which states that: "1.- Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one's choice. 2.- The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall not be subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent imposition of liability, which shall be expressly established by law to the extent necessary to ensure: a) respect for the rights or reputations of others; or b) the protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals. 3.- The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of information, or by any other means tending to impede the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions. 4.- Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2 above, public entertainments may be subject by law to prior censorship for the sole purpose of regulating access to them for the moral protection of childhood and adolescence. 5.-Any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitute incitements to lawless violence or to any other similar action against any person or group of persons on any grounds including those of race, color, religion, language, or national origin shall be considered as offenses punishable by law."[62]
Consequently, if it is considered that the presentation of the theatrical work in question could entail the applicability of Article 13.4, it might be the task of the corresponding administrative organ to perform the relevant corrective measures.[63]
Article 13.1 of the American Convention specifically provides that freedom of thought and expression may be exercised orally, in writing, in print, or in the form of art.[64]
In this way, by writing the theatrical piece and making it public by presenting it, the authors and other people who were involved in this production and presentation exercised their right to freedom of expression, which cannot be subject to prior censorship by any organ, notwithstanding the responsibilities which might arise by the commission of offenses or abuses during its creation or representation, or of the measures that might be taken in the case portrayed by Article 13.4 of the Convention, as was explained above. Therefore, if the appeal were admitted and the subsequent exhibitions of the piece which has given rise to it prohibited, this Court would incur in a form of prior censorship, which is forbidden to this Court. Consequently, this Court understands that it must be rejected (…).[65]
[42] See IACHR, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2002, Volume III, Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, Doc. 5 rev. 1, March 7, 2003, Chapter III.
[43] See IACHR, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2000, Volume III, Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, Doc. 20 rev., April 16, 2001, Chapter II.
[44]The original text reads: "Según el marco normativo en materia de radiodifusión, para poder concursar a fin de ser prestadora legalmente autorizada de una estación de radiodifusión sonora con modulación de frecuencia, se requiere necesariamente ser persona física o sociedad comercial, legalmente constituida, lo que excluye a las sociedades civiles, cooperativas y asociaciones mutuales sin fines de lucro."
[45]The original text reads: "Tal reglamentación no puede ser arbitraria y excluir de un modo absoluto, sin sustento en un criterio objetivo razonable, a determinadas personas jurídicas de la posibilidad de acceder a una licencia de radiodifusión por no haberse constituido en una sociedad comercial, pues ello importa, en definitiva, una irrazonable limitación al derecho a expresar se libremente y de asociarse o no hacerlo."
[46]The original text reads: "La participación de una asociación mutual en un concurso público para acceder a una licencia de radiodifusión, en el supuesto de ser seleccionada, facilita el pluralismo de opiniones que caracteriza a las sociedades democráticas, e importa un verdadero contrapeso o poder equilibrador de los grupos económicos. Por lo que la limitación que establecen las normas impugnadas no tiene fundamento alguno e importa una clara violación al derecho de asociarse con fines útiles, pues impone cuál debe ser el espíritu que ha de animar a quienes conforman tal organización colectiva, sin que se sustente en un motivo suficiente que justifique que ciertas entidades de bien público no puedan desarrollar una actividad que es cultural por esencia."
[47]The original text reads: "No se advierte la existencia de un interés superior que autorice a prohibir que la actora intervenga en un concurso público para normalizar su situación legal y poder, en el caso de ser seleccionada, ejercer su derecho a la libre expresión. Por lo que el párrafo primero del Art. 45 de la ley 22285 y las normas dictadas en su consecuencia, en cuanto impiden que la demandante participe en concursos para la obtención de una licencia por no constituirse en una sociedad comercial, resultan violatorias de los Arts. 14, 16, 28 y 75, inc. 23, de la Constitución Nacional y del Art. 13 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos."
[48]The original text reads: "En lo que se refiere a la solicitud de acceso a la información formulada por el recurrente, es preciso indicar que presenta dos vertientes que demandan una solución diferenciada para evitar equívocos, a saber: a) La solicitud de información acerca de las cuentas corrientes que poseen, específicamente, los Partidos Unidad Social Cristiana y Liberación Nacional y, en general, cualquier partido que haya participado en las últimas elecciones nacionales y b) la solicitud acerca de las cuentas corrientes que poseen varias sociedades anónimas presuntamente vinculadas con las tesorerías de campaña de los partidos referidos. En lo relativo al supuesto a) es menester indicar que en vista de la sujeción del patrimonio de los partidos políticos -independientemente de su origen privado o público- a los principios de publicidad y transparencia por expresa disposición constitucional (artículo 96, párrafo 3°) la cantidad de cuentas corrientes, sus movimientos y los balances que los partidos políticos poseen en los Bancos Comerciales del Estado, bancos privados y cualquier entidad financiera no bancaria son de interés público y, por consiguiente, pueden ser accesados por cualquier persona."
[49]The original text reads: "En lo tocante a la hipótesis b) este Tribunal estima que el número de cuentas corrientes que posea una persona jurídica u organización colectiva del Derecho Privado -Sociedad Anónima, Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada, Fundación, Asociación, etc.-, sus movimientos y sus balances, en tesis de principio, sí están cubiertas por el derecho a la intimidad, puesto que, en esta hipótesis no opera la limitación constitucional expresa establecida para las contribuciones de los partidos políticos. En tal supuesto, rige, además, el instituto legislativo del secreto bancario contemplado en el artículo 615 del Código de Comercio para el contrato de cuenta corriente. La regla anterior tiene como excepción la demostración fehaciente e idónea que un partido político le ha transferido a una de tales personas jurídicas parte de sus aportaciones privadas, puesto que, de ser así la información dejaría de ser privada -propia de una relación meramente contractual- y se tornaría de interés público."
[50]The original text reads: "(…) se impone declarar con lugar el recurso de amparo, únicamente, en cuanto a la solicitud de información acerca de las cuentas corrientes que tienen a su nombre en el banco recurrido los Partidos Unidad Social Cristiana, Liberación Nacional y cualquier otro que participara en las últimas elecciones nacionales, así como de las empresas Gramínea Plateada y Bayamo al haberse demostrado que a nombre de estas empresas fueron abiertas cuentas corrientes para organizar el flujo de ingresos y gastos de la campaña electoral del Partido Unidad Social Cristiana."
[51] The accusation referred to an alleged violation of Articles No. 333 or 334 of the Criminal Code of Uruguay.
[52] The original text reads: "(…) en nuestro país la libertad de expresión, siguiendo la tendencia inaugurada en el año 1830, se encuentra actualmente consagrada en el art. 29 de la Constitución Nacional, en cuanto dispone que “es enteramente libre, en toda materia, la comunicación de pensamientos por palabras, escritos privados o publicados en la prensa, o por cualquier otra forma de divulgación, sin necesidad de previa censura; quedando responsable el autor y, en su caso, el impresor o emisor, con arreglo a la ley por los abusos que se cometieren."
[53]The original text reads: "El texto en cuestión, se encuentra en perfecta consonancia y armonía con las normas internacionales de derechos humanos que reconocen el derecho a la libertad de expresión. Es así que se encuentra consagrado en el art. 13 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, en el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos (art. 19), en la Convención Europea de Derechos Humanos (art. 10), en la Carta Africana de Derechos Humanos (art. 9), en la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos (art. 19) y en la Declaración Americana de Derechos Humanos (art. IV)."
[54]The original text reads: "(…) el caso que nos ocupa, dado que se cuestionan los dichos del enjuiciado emitidos en sendos artículos periodísticos con amplia difusión pública, supone el enfrentamiento de dos derechos fundamentales: por un lado el derecho a la libertad de expresión del pensamiento -en su forma de libertad de prensa o de información- del denunciado y por el otro el derecho del honor del denunciante; ambos amparados por la normativa nacional e internacional referida."
[55]The original text reads "Para ello nos permitiremos mencionar nuevamente lo que al respecto señala la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos (Pacto de San José de Costa Rica) –que, bueno es recordarlo, es derecho vigente en nuestro país, a partir de su aprobación por la Ley No. 15.737 de 8 de marzo de 1985- la que, a texto expreso aborda la cuestión planteada al señalar en su art. 13 numeral 2do. que: “... el ejercicio del derecho previsto en el inciso precedente (la libertad de pensamiento y expresión) no puede estar sujeto a previa censura sino a responsabilidades ulteriores, las que deben estar expresamente fijadas por la ley y ser necesarias para asegurar: a) el respecto a los derechos o a la reputación de los demás ...”.
[56]The original text reads: "La Convención también, en su art. 11, reconoce la protección de la honra y de la dignidad, cuando señala que “... nadie puede ser objeto de injerencias arbitrarias o abusivas en su vida privada, en la de su familia, en su domicilio o en su correspondencia, ni de ataques ilegales a su honra o reputación...” y “... toda persona tiene derecho a la protección de la ley contra esas injerencias o ataques ...”.
La Declaración Americana de los Derechos del Hombre también así lo consagra en su art. V al establecer que “toda persona tiene derecho a la protección de la ley contra los ataques abusivos a su honra, a su reputación y a su vida privada y familiar."
[57]The original text reads: "Por su parte, en lo que tiene directa relación con los conflictos que se originen entre el derecho al honor y el derecho a la libertad de expresión, la Comisión en su informe No. 11/96 relativo al caso No. 11.230 sostuvo el principio de que el derecho al honor no tiene una jerarquía superior que la que tiene el derecho a la libertad de expresión. En tal sentido recordó que el art. 29 establece que “ninguna disposición de la presente Convención puede ser interpretada en el sentido de: a) permitir a alguno de los Estados partes, grupo o persona, suprimir el goce y ejercicio de los derechos y libertades reconocidos en la Convención o limitarlos en mayor medida que la prevista en ella; y que el art. 32.2 dispone que “los derechos de cada persona están limitados por los derechos de los demás, por la seguridad de todos y por las justas exigencias del bien común, en esa sociedad democrática”.
[58]The original text reads: " En el Informe Anual de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos del año 1994 por su parte, se señaló sobre el tema que “la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (“la Corte”) ha declarado que, dado que la libertad de expresión y pensamiento desempeña una función crucial y central en el debate público, la Convención Americana otorga un “valor sumamente elevado” a este derecho y reduce al mínimo toda restricción al mismo. Como lo señaló la Corte, es en interés del “orden público democrático” tal como está concebido por la Convención Americana que se respete escrupulosamente el derecho de cada ser humano de expresarse libremente".
[59]The original text reads: "Ahora bien, de los fallos y opiniones mencionadas, se pueden extraer varias conclusiones cuya consideración el intérprete deberá tener siempre presente si es que quiere arribar a una justa solución de la muy delicada cuestión puesta en sus manos.
Ellos son:
En primer lugar, que el principio general a tener presente –que no es absoluto naturalmente- es que tanto en la normativa nacional como internacional, el derecho a la libertad de expresión, dado el crucial y central papel que desempeña en el debate público y su indisoluble vinculación con las sociedades e instituciones democráticas, cuando es ejercido en forma legítima, posee un “valor sumamente elevado” que lo ubica en un plano superior al de los demás derechos civiles.-
En segundo lugar que, dada su situación de preeminencia, toda restricción al mismo debe, necesariamente, reducirse al mínimo; y cualquier interferencia deberá siempre estar vinculada con las legítimas necesidades de una sociedad democrática.-
En tercer lugar, que la protección que ofrece este derecho no solo debe extenderse a las ideas favorables, sino también y sobre todo, a aquéllas ideas que puedan resultar ofensivas, perturbadoras, exageradas, provocativas o chocantes pues, tales son las exigencias del pluralismo y la apertura mental sin las cuales no es posible que exista una sociedad democrática.-
En cuarto lugar, que si bien este derecho no ampara ni los agravios, ni la injuria, ni la calumnia, ni la difamación; y tampoco protege la falsedad, la mentira o la inexactitud cuando es fruto de la total y absoluta despreocupación por verificar la realidad de la información. Sí ampara a la prensa cuando la información se refiere a cuestiones públicas o a funcionarios públicos, aún en el caso de que la noticia tuviera expresiones falsas o inexactas, siempre y cuando su autor las crea verdaderas y su propósito haya sido el de ilustrar a la opinión pública del tema tratado, de buena fe y sin malicia.-
En quinto lugar, que la posición de preferencia que posee la libertad de expresión por sobre los otros derechos se mantendrá, siempre y cuando: a) la información que de ella emane resulte “'útil” a una sociedad democrática; y b) existan bases objetivas que induzcan al informador a considerar que dicha información es cierta, aún cuando posteriormente se demuestre el hecho como objetivamente falso.-
Y en sexto y último lugar -lo que en definitiva resume todo los antes señalado- que en caso de que el periodista haya ejercido en forma legítima este derecho, no es posible concluir jurídicamente que el derecho al honor se hubiera visto lesionado de forma alguna."
[60]The original text reads: "En suma, en función de todo lo expresado, siendo que el derecho al honor del denunciante no se ha visto afectado en razón de que el periodista, Sr. Sergio Israel Dubinsky, en nuestro concepto, ha ejercido en forma legítima la libertad de informar, corresponde concluir, en mérito a lo establecido por el art. 10 de la Constitución de la República, que su conducta ha quedado exenta de la autoridad de este magistrado."
[61] The original text reads: "Que, los recurrentes expresan, conforme se ha explicado en los fundamentos 1º y 5º de este fallo, cómo mediante la representación de la pieza citada se conculcaría el derecho del respeto y protección a la honra de la persona y de la familia de don Arturo Prat Chacón, de todo chileno como, también, de los integrantes del Instituto Histórico que lleva su nombre. El precepto que contempla el derecho que consideran amagado está contenido, como se ha dicho anteriormente, en el artículo 19 Nº 4 de la Carta Fundamental que establece: La Constitución asegura a todas las personas: el respeto y protección a la vida privada y pública y a la honra de la persona y de su familia (...)."
[62] The original text reads:"(…) la Constitución Política en su artículo 19, Nº 12, inciso primero, establece que ésta: asegura a todas las personas: la libertad de emitir opiniones y de informar sin censura previa, en cualquier forma y por cualquier medio, sin perjuicio de responder de los delitos y abusos que se cometan en el ejercicio de estas libertades,.... Este derecho fundamental se encuentra, por su parte, contenido en el artículo 13 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos o Pacto de San José que establece: 1.- toda persona tiene derecho a la libertad de pensamiento y de expresión. Este derecho comprende la libertad de buscar, recibir y difundir informaciones e ideas de toda índole, sin consideración de fronteras, ya sea oralmente, por escrito o en forma impresa o artística o por cualquier otro procedimiento de su elección. 2.- El ejercicio del derecho previsto en el inciso precedente no puede estar sujeto a previa censura sino a responsabilidades ulteriores, las que deben estar expresamente fijadas por la Ley y ser necesarias para asegurar: a) el respeto a los derechos o a la reputación de los demás, o b) la protección de la seguridad nac ional, el orden público o la salud o la moral públicas. 3.- No se puede restringir el derecho de expresión por vías o medios indirectos, tales como el abuso de controles oficiales o particulares de papel para periódicos, de frecuencias radioeléctricas, o de enseres y aparatos usados en la difusión de información o por cualesquiera otros medios encaminados a impedir la comunicación y la circulación de ideas y opiniones. 4.- Los espectáculos públicos pueden ser sometidos por la ley a censura previa con el exclusivo objeto de regular el acceso a ellos para la protección moral de la infancia y la adolescencia, sin perjuicio de lo establecido en el inciso 2. 5.- Estará prohibida por la ley toda propaganda a favor de la guerra y toda apología del odio nacional, racial o religioso que constituyan incitaciones a la violencia o cualquier otra acción ilegal similar contra cualquier persona o grupo de personas, por ningún motivo inclusive los de raza, color, religión, idioma u origen nacional."
[63]The original text reads: "Que, en consecuencia, si llegara a estimarse que, mediante la representación de la pieza teatral comentada, pudiere incurrirse en la situación que contempla el artículo 13 de la citada Convención en su número 4, podría caberle al órgano administrativo correspondiente, en su oportunidad, impetrar las medidas correctivas procedentes. "
[64]The original text reads: "Que, entre las formas de exteriorizarse la libertad de pensamiento y de expresión, el Nº 1 del artículo 13 del Pacto de San José dispone, en forma explícita, que éste derecho puede manifestarse: ya sea oralmente, por escrito o en forma impresa o artística."
[65]The original text reads: "Que, de este modo, al haberse escrito la pieza teatral y difundido mediante su representación, los autores y demás personas que estuvieron comprometidos en dicha producción y divulgación hicieron uso de su libertad de expresión, la cual no puede ser censurada por ningún órgano, sin perjuicio de las responsabilidades que pudieren surgir con motivo de la comisión de posibles delitos o daños que pudieren ocasionarse mediante su creación y/o representación o de las medidas que pudieren adoptarse, en el caso en que se incurriere en la situación contemplada en el numeral 4 del artículo 13 de la Convención mencionada, conforme ha explicado precedentemente. De impedirse, por lo tanto, ulteriores exhibiciones de la pieza que ha motivado la presentación de recurso, acogiéndolo, se incurriría en una forma de censura previa, lo que está vedado a este tribunal, por ello, esta Corte considera que corresponde rechazarlo (…)".